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Fitness plays many roles throughout evolutionary theory,
from a measure of populations in the wild to a central
element in abstract theoretical presentations of natural
selection. It has thus been the subject of an extensive
philosophical literature, which has primarily centred on
the way to understand the relationship between fitness
values and reproductive outcomes. If fitness is a probabilistic or statistical quantity, how is it to be defined in
general theoretical contexts? How can it be measured?
Can a single conceptual model for fitness be offered that
applies to all biological cases, or must fitness measures be
case-specific? Philosophers have explored these questions
over the last several decades, largely in the context of an
influential definition of fitness proposed in the late 1970s:
the propensity interpretation. This interpretation as first
described undeniably suffers from significant difficulties,
and debate regarding the tenability of amendments and
alternatives to it remains unsettled.

Introduction
Few concepts have elicited such a long and heated debate in
the philosophy of biology as that of ﬁtness. Although ﬁtness was not a central theoretical term in Darwin’s 1859
original articulation of his theory of evolution, it quickly
rose to importance. Evolution by natural selection is now
standardly presented (e.g. Lewontin, 1970) as requiring
three conditions: variation, heritability and ﬁtness diﬀerences. Empirically, evolutionary studies are thus to a large
degree studies of ﬁtness diﬀerences and their consequences.
Moreover ﬁtness, symbolised as W, is a key variable in
the mathematical formulations of evolutionary theory.
See also: Fitness
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The fact that biologists model and measure ﬁtness seems
to imply that ﬁtness is a (measurable) property and that
some biological entities are bearers of this property.
However, this leads to several questions. What sort of
property is ﬁtness? Is it, say, a causal property, allowing one
to justiﬁably say that some biological entities of a particular
kind outcompeted the others because (where this because is
understood causally) they were ﬁtter? And what sort of
biological entities can legitimately be considered bearers of
the property of ﬁtness? Can genes, organisms, populations
or even species have ﬁtness values? The last of these questions is strongly linked with the ‘levels/units of selection
problem’ and it is therefore not the focus of this article. In
particular, the question of whether to deﬁne ﬁtness as a
property of token organisms or of types of organisms has
been the subject of some debate. Setting this debate aside,
this article will centre on the nature of the property of
individual ﬁtness. Similarly, issues of individuation will not
be considered. If one is to compare the ﬁtness of two
individuals, then one must have a way of identifying them
as distinct individuals. Although individuality is fairly
obvious for some taxa (e.g. alligators or apple trees) it is far
from obvious in others (e.g. aphids or aspens). The individuation of organisms will be taken for granted in what
follows, but it should be emphasized that this is an
important issue related to that of ﬁtness. See Chapter 4 of
Godfrey-Smith (2009) for an excellent introduction to
issues in reproduction and individuality. See also: Group
Selection; Philosophy of Selection: Units and Levels;
Selection: Units and Levels
Setting aside the arguments over individuation and the
levels of selection and assuming that organisms are one of
the kinds of entities that can bear ﬁtness, one can begin to
ask what sort of property organismic ﬁtness might be.
Fitness is often broken down into (at least) two components, viability and fecundity. The former concerns
survival to maturity, whereas the latter concerns the production of oﬀspring once mature. Throughout the history
of evolutionary theory, ﬁtness has occasionally been considered to be the organism’s total oﬀspring production, or a
combination of these factors. The ﬁtness of any organism,
on this view, is just the number of oﬀspring that it actually
has – and, if it is reproductively successful, its ﬁtness will
‘ratchet up’ with each oﬀspring it bears.
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This understanding of ﬁtness as a measure of actual
reproductive success (henceforth ‘realised ﬁtness’) has the
merits of being simple and readily measurable. However, it
has some signiﬁcant problems. Fitness is often used to
explain evolutionary outcomes – organisms of one type are
said to out-reproduce those of another type because the
former are ﬁtter than the latter. However, if ﬁtness is just
realised ﬁtness, then the claim that ‘the ﬁtter organisms outreproduce the less-ﬁt’ is equivalent to ‘the organisms that
reproduce more out-reproduce those which reproduce
less,’ a simple tautology. This argument, an old one in
evolutionary theory (see, e.g. Butler, 1879, pp. 351–355),
was taken up occasionally by philosophers (e.g. Popper,
1974), and is still utilised by creationists (Pennock, 1999, p.
101). Understanding ﬁtness as realized ﬁtness, then, results
in an arguably fatal ﬂaw.
In addition to the tautology problem, another problem
with equating ﬁtness with actual reproductive success is
that it precludes distinguishing evolutionary responses due
to ﬁtness diﬀerences from those due to genetic drift. It is
generally understood that populations exhibit drift, and
that the magnitude of drift increases as the population size
decreases. However, if ﬁtness is equated with evolutionary
outcomes, it can no longer be contrasted with drift, either
as a distinct kind of outcome or as a distinct kind of cause.
It is for these reasons that philosophers have sought conceptions of ﬁtness that are not equated with evolutionary
outcomes. The philosophical debate has centred on a
position known as the propensity interpretation of ﬁtness
(PIF), which will be the focus of what follows.

The Propensity Interpretation of
Fitness
The PIF was introduced in the late 1970s by Brandon
(1978) and Mills and Beatty (1979). They argued that
instead of considering the ﬁtness of organisms to be identiﬁed with the actual number of oﬀspring produced, ﬁtness
should instead be equated with the probabilistic propensity
to produce oﬀspring – a distribution of probability values
describing how likely it is that an organism will produce no
oﬀspring, one oﬀspring, etc. The PIF, then, appears to
solve the problems just discussed. First, if ﬁtness is a propensity, then it is a kind of dispositional property. Consider
solubility, a common example of a dispositional property.
The fact that an object (a grain of salt, say) is soluble does
not mean that it actually will dissolve, but that it would,
were it placed in the appropriate circumstances. Similarly,
the ﬁtness of an organism does not determine a particular
reproductive outcome (unless one particular value in the
distribution has a probability of 1), but describes how that
organism is disposed to reproduce in diﬀerent kinds of
circumstances. And the degree to which outcomes can be
explained by probabilistic causes (itself a contentious
philosophical question; see also Mayr (1961)), the
2

organism’s actual reproductive success is causally
explained by its ﬁtness.
If ﬁtness is a dispositional property, then, unlike in the
case of realised ﬁtness, drift can be distinguished from
selection. There are debates about how, precisely, this
distinction should be drawn. Some, for example, argue that
selection and drift represent distinct causes (Hodge, 1987;
Millstein, 2006), whereas others hold that the distinction is
best understood in terms of outcomes (Matthen and Ariew,
2002; Walsh, 2007). This issue aside, it is clear that if ﬁtness
is understood in terms of realised outcomes only, then the
theoretical resources for distinguishing selection and drift
do not exist.
As an example of how drift might be distinguished from
selection, consider that the PIF provides a probability
distribution over possible values of oﬀspring production.
An organism may have a probability of 0.2 of having 0
oﬀspring, a probability of 0.1 of having 1 oﬀspring, etc.
Now consider how we would describe the reproductive
output of all the individuals with a particular trait (having
brown, as opposed to grey fur). This will again be a
probability distribution, derivable from the individuallevel distributions. If we take the arithmetic mean of the
distribution, we are provided with the expected number of
copies of the trait that will appear in the next generation.
Assuming the trait is perfectly heritable, and that there is
no migration or mutation (and other usual caveats), ﬁtness values thus provide us with expectation values for the
proportion of individuals possessing the traits found in
the next generation (the ratio of individuals with brown
fur, say). Depending on how drift is understood (a topic
too far aﬁeld for us here), deviations from those expectation values either count as genetic drift or provide evidence for drift (though the nature and weight of this
evidence will vary depending on the precise deﬁnition of
genetic drift in use). Moreover, as there will be fewer
individuals to be sampled from in small populations, there
will be a larger deviation from this expectation value in
these populations. (For the same reason, the deviation
from the expectation value of a fair coin will tend to
decrease with the number of ﬂips. You would predict a
large deviation from 50–50 for a sequence of three ﬂips,
but a small deviation for 300 ﬂips.) The PIF thus allows
for the conceptual distinction between drift and selection,
and also reﬂects the observation that drift tends to have a
higher magnitude in small populations. See also: Drift:
Introduction; Drift: Theoretical Aspects

Challenges to the PIF
Despite the clear beneﬁts of the PIF over realised ﬁtness,
the PIF as originally described suﬀers from serious problems. Considered here are some of the key challenges to the
PIF. The possible responses to these challenges are discussed in the next two sections.

eLS & 2013, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. www.els.net

Fitness: Philosophical Problems

Challenge 1: The PIF makes fitness
unknowable
In practice, the ﬁtness of individual organisms will be difﬁcult to ascertain under the PIF framework, and ﬁtness
values cannot be directly determined by observing a small
number of cases of actual oﬀspring production. Given that
the propensity proposed by the PIF manifests as a probability distribution over all possible numbers of oﬀspring, a
large number of similar (if not clonal) organisms in similar
environments will need to be observed in order to have any
conﬁdence in our estimate of an individual’s ﬁtness. In
almost all biological cases, this will be exceedingly diﬃcult.

Challenge 2: The arithmetic mean is not
always a good way of modelling the
propensity
Although describing the probability distribution associated with the reproductive success of an organism is useful,
there are also many circumstances in which ﬁtness must be
considered as a single numerical value, to enable comparisons between the ﬁtnesses of diﬀerent organisms. As
mentioned above, the traditional way to formalise this in
the PIF is to let the numerical value of ﬁtness be equal to the
arithmetic mean or expectation value of the probability
distribution. It has long been known, however, that the
arithmetic mean is not always the best predictor of future
population success (see, e.g. Lewontin and Cohen, 1969;
Gillespie, 1974), and this problem was even noted by some
of the creators of the PIF (Beatty and Finsen, 1989). In
some of these cases, a geometric mean (or some other
measure) may oﬀer a better prediction of a trait’s future
frequency. The defender of the PIF must, therefore, either
provide a method for reducing this probability distribution
to a single numerical value – one that takes into account the
fact that the arithmetic mean will not always be the best
choice – or they must argue why such a reduction is not
necessary for the cogency of the PIF.

Challenge 3: How the PIF is understood
changes with differing environmental
circumstances, population structure, etc.
Many researchers (Rosenberg, 1982; Sober, 2001; Matthen
and Ariew, 2002; Ariew and Lewontin, 2004; Bouchard
and Rosenberg, 2004) have argued that one basic theoretical premise in the PIF is ﬂawed. The PIF assumes, they
argue, that a single deﬁnition of the concept of ﬁtness can
be adequate to describe the ﬁtness of individual organisms
in all biological circumstances, and this is a false assumption. Some have argued further that ﬁtness can only be
speciﬁed by relativising to a particular set of ﬁtness components of interest in a particular set of local environmental
circumstances, or even to a particular pair of organisms of
interest. As environment, population structure and other
local factors change, the very deﬁnition of ﬁtness, they

argue, must change with them. To salvage the PIF, then, its
defenders must show that it is sensitive in the appropriate
way to all these inﬂuences, and that the theoretical worries
raised by these critics concerning the possibility of a general
measure of ﬁtness are unfounded.

Challenge 4: What facts determine the
probability distribution in the PIF? What are
its environmental scope and time frame?
In the initial description of the PIF above, the precise facts
that are to be used to ﬁx the values of the probability distribution were left unspeciﬁed. Are these only facts about
currently living organisms and their projected oﬀspring
numbers? To deal with mutations with eﬀects on future
generations (Crow and Kimura, 1956; Ahmed and Hodgkin, 2000), should the PIF take into account descendants in
later generations? Building on the last challenge, which
environmental factors should be considered part of ﬁtness
calculations, and which should be considered ‘external’ to
individual ﬁtness? The defender of the PIF will need to
provide general answers to these questions in order for the
probability distribution to be well founded in all biological
cases.

Responses Abandoning the PIF
One obvious way to respond to this set of rather thorny
challenges is by abandoning the PIF entirely, and
developing a new way to understand individual ﬁtness. One
such attempt was put forth by Bouchard and Rosenberg
(2004). They argue that the focus on propensities – in
particular, the focus on measuring ﬁtness using propensities – is mistaken. The fundamental notion of ﬁtness
is, rather, comparative. The best we can hope for in a
general interpretation of ﬁtness, then, deﬁnes ﬁtness in
terms of two organisms a and b, and an environment E:
a is ﬁtter than b in E=a’s traits result in its solving the
design problems set by E more fully than b’s traits.
(Bouchard and Rosenberg, 2004, p. 699)
They call this notion ‘ecological ﬁtness,’ and endeavour
to respond to several of the diﬃcult philosophical issues
inherent both in providing a deﬁnition of ‘design problems’
and measuring how well organisms might ‘solve’ those
problems. See also: Adaptation and Constraint: Overview
Another highly inﬂuential attempt to develop an alternative to the PIF has come to be known as the ‘statisticalist’
interpretation of evolutionary theory. As framed in Matthen and Ariew (2002) (see also Walsh et al., 2002; Pigliucci
and Kaplan, 2006, chap. 1), the PIF’s troubles come from a
conﬂation of two senses of ‘ﬁtness’ that ought, in fact, to be
kept distinct. The ‘vernacular’ notion of ﬁtness is a highly
general, usually descriptive concept of ﬁtness. It appears in
some characterisations of natural selection such as the
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‘principle of natural selection’ (i.e. that ‘if A has higher
ﬁtness than B in E, then A will probably outcompete B over
time’, see Bouchard and Rosenberg, 2004). This is to be
contrasted with the ‘predictive’ notion of ﬁtness as it
appears in population genetics or mathematical biology.
Predictive ﬁtness is strictly speciﬁed, only valid in very
precise circumstances, and quantiﬁable. See also: Population Genetics: Overview
The trouble with the propensity interpretation, Matthen
and Ariew argue, is that it mistakenly takes these two
notions of ﬁtness to be connected – that is, both that the
propensity itself is a characterisation of vernacular ﬁtness,
and that the expected number of oﬀspring given that propensity is a characterisation of predictive ﬁtness. They oﬀer
several arguments to the eﬀect that, in many cases, predictive and vernacular ﬁtness simply cannot be related, and
that in any event, the connection oﬀered by the PIF is the
wrong one.
The statisticalist interpretation goes further than this, on
two fronts. First, vernacular ﬁtness, they claim – due to its
generality and, as we saw in the challenges above, the
impossibility of specifying a universally valid formula
connecting it to components of ﬁtness – is not particularly
useful in coming to understand biological populations.
This is yet another place where the PIF has gone astray. It is
rather the predictive ﬁtness (and, in particular, the predictive ﬁtness of traits and not of individual organisms)
that is the appropriate target for biological study (Walsh
et al., 2002; Walsh, 2003, 2004, 2007).
Second, there is a further, and more important, reason
that a singular conceptual picture of vernacular ﬁtness
fails. A particular ﬁtness distribution can be the result of
many diﬀerent types of causes. We might, in one population, determine that some sex-ratio strategy is beneﬁcial,
and that in another population a particular parental care
strategy is beneﬁcial (Matthen and Ariew, 2002, p. 67). In
both cases, we are justiﬁed in saying that the outcomes at
issue increase the ﬁtness of the respective organisms.
However, to phrase this change in terms of a general notion
of vernacular ﬁtness is, the statisticalist interpretation
argues, to miss the point. Although both strategies may
have ‘high’ vernacular ﬁtness – perhaps even both instantiate the same ﬁtness distribution – the causes of this
distribution are radically diﬀerent, and the PIF fails, it is
claimed, to recognise or suﬃciently account for this fact.
Finally, one more target of the statisticalist line of
argument brings us into contact with an aspect of the
PIF that was only brieﬂy mentioned above. In addition to
the idea that ﬁtness is derivable from the propensity to
produce oﬀspring, and that it should be measured by
the expected oﬀspring number, the ‘traditional’ PIF
claimed that ﬁtness plays a particular sort of causal role in
natural selection. In this view, when we say that on a
standard view of natural selection, ﬁtter organisms will
outperform the less ﬁt, we mean (at least in part) that this
higher ﬁtness is a cause of this higher performance. The
ﬁtness of individuals is causally responsible for their
evolutionary success.
4

The statisticalist interpretation also strongly rejects this
claim. Rather than playing a causal role in the biological
world, ﬁtness – along with natural selection and genetic
drift – are merely pragmatically useful ways to summarise
events that take place in the biological world. There is
nothing causally signiﬁcant about these summaries, and it
is only prudence and the good judgment of investigators
that leads us to sometimes measure ﬁtness in one way,
sometimes in another. See also: Fitness and Selection
The claims of the statisticalist interpretation constitute a
dramatic revision of our conceptual structure for ﬁtness,
selection and drift, and have therefore been hotly contested
in the philosophical literature – see, for example, Matthen
(2009), Matthen and Ariew (2009), Walsh (2010), and
Lewens (2010) in support, and Reisman and Forber (2005),
Brandon and Ramsey (2006), Millstein (2006), Abrams
(2007), Shapiro and Sober (2007), Gildenhuys (2009) and
Ramsey (2013) in opposition.

Responses in Defence of the PIF
Several other researchers, meanwhile, have oﬀered ways in
which to salvage the central insights of the PIF, attempting
to sidestep the problems developed above. One modiﬁcation of the PIF, originally proposed by Beatty and Finsen
(1989) and elaborated by Brandon (1990), is intended to
address the problem of reducing the PIF to a single
numerical value. Perhaps it was a mistake, then, to think
that one single way of making this reduction was suitable in
all circumstances and that, as discussed in challenge 2, the
arithmetic mean is not the appropriate single mathematical
model of the PIF. Brandon (1990, p. 20) modiﬁed the original expected-value formula for ﬁtness, introducing a
‘correction factor’ intended to compensate for the eﬀects of
inﬂuences like variance. This correction factor takes the
form of a function of the environment and the variance,
added to the expected number of oﬀspring, which Brandon
termed f(E,s2). This makes the PIF provide not a single
numerical value for individual ﬁtness, but a ‘schema’ of
possible equations, each of which needs to be ﬁlled out
given the details of the particular population to be measured, the distribution of variation within it and so forth.
Such a defence could preserve the central insights of the
PIF, at the cost of losing a mathematically uniﬁed deﬁnition of ﬁtness (see Abrams, 2009).
A related approach, taken by Pence and Ramsey (2013),
is to develop a more complicated conceptual and mathematical formulation of the PIF that can manage to avoid
the objections developed above. Although the PIF understands organismic ﬁtness as a propensity of individuals to
have oﬀspring, it says nothing about how that propensity
should be analysed conceptually. The model oﬀered by
Pence and Ramsey thus attempts to provide a more
detailed vocabulary in which to describe this propensity,
and with it a more intricate way in which to compute a
numerical measure of ﬁtness, drawn from adaptive
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dynamics. The Pence and Ramsey proposal is attempting
to at once address challenges 2–4.
Implicit in the Pence and Ramsey approach is another
way to defend the PIF, originally mentioned by Brandon
(1990) and developed in more detail by Millstein (in press).
As we have stated, the PIF has multiple interrelated components. One of these, which we might call the ‘nonmathematical’ portion of the PIF, is the claim that the
ﬁtness of an organism can be understood in terms of its
propensity to produce oﬀspring. Another, the ‘mathematical’ portion of the PIF, is the claim that the best
measure of this propensity is the expected number of oﬀspring. Both the responses we have just seen have
attempted to salvage this mathematical portion of the PIF.
But is this really necessary? Millstein (in press) argues that
it would be better served if these two questions can be
separated. Discarding this mathematical approach, and
arguing for the propensity interpretation as an answer to
the question of ‘what ﬁtness is’, she claims, can evade many
of these posed diﬃculties while leaving the question of the
comparison of ﬁtness distributions as a problem for
mathematical biology. This addresses challenges 2–4 by
arguing that the PIF does not stand or fall based on the
quality of the mathematical models with which it is
associated.
Finally, concerning challenge 1, does the diﬃculty of
measuring the quantity described by the PIF undercut it as
an interpretation of ﬁtness? One response is to point out
that there are multiple possible roles that an interpretation
of ﬁtness can play. If an interpretation plays one role well
(serving as a theoretical foundation for ﬁtness, say), it does
not follow that it should also be useful for another (such as
studying evolution in natural populations with limited
data). On this response, the PIF is oﬀered not as a measurable model for ﬁtness in experimental studies (Endler,
1986), but rather as a way to ground theoretical considerations of natural selection in general – discussions of
selection that are supposed to apply to every possible natural population, like those of Lewontin (1970) or Thoday
(1953).

Conclusions
The debate over the best understanding of biological ﬁtness
has stood as a central problem in philosophical work on
evolutionary theory for nearly 25 years, beginning with the
rejection of the deﬁnition of ﬁtness as actual contribution
of oﬀspring to the next generation. The ‘traditional’ version of the PIF now certainly shows its age, and has accumulated several counterexamples that are quite probably
fatal. Several plausible ways forward are apparent – from
moderate revisions of the PIF or novel ways to argue for its
central insights, to the complete rejection of the PIF and a
view of ﬁtness as a statistical predictor set by the interests of
particular investigators. This debate, as well, has ramiﬁcations for the ways in which we see natural selection,
genetic drift and indeed the entire conceptual structure of

evolutionary theory. See also: Adaptation and Natural
Selection: Overview; Drift: Introduction; Evolution: Views
of; Natural Selection: Introduction; Philosophy of Selection: Units and Levels
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